In short, in everything devoid of matter, intellect and its object of apprehension are one and the same.

I say:

Abū al-Barakāt wrote a treatise on knowledge in which he discussed much the same matters as in al-Mu'tabar. He said:

“This is the position transmitted from Aristotle in Book Lambda of his work known as the Metaphysics. Thinking people have circulated it, minds have examined it, and commentators have discussed it at length.

“Its purpose is clear: to exalt the First Principle above deriving perfection from anything else, which would make it intrinsically deficient relative to that perfection; above acquiring otherness through visual apprehension, undergoing change through apprehending changing things, experiencing fatigue through continuously apprehending them as they crowd upon it, and passing from potentiality to actuality in acting upon them.”

He said:

“Since the meaning of this statement has now become readily apparent, there is no need to elaborate. Yet this is a position that, when examined through purely rational inquiry, has no firm footing.”

He then continued his discussion of it.

Abū al-Barakāt said in al-Mu'tabar:

“Earlier, Aristotle had said something intended to deny that new states could arise in it and to preclude its changing from one state to another, so that he could apply this judgment to knowledge and cognition.”

He said:

“The First Cause cannot be acted upon, and all of these are