This third position resembles the view chosen by Ibn Rushd. As for the second and first positions, these are the two that al-Ghazālī attributed to the philosophers. He said:

“Some of them say that He knows only His own essence, while others concede that He knows what is other than His essence.”

He said:

“This is the view chosen by Ibn Sīnā, who claimed that He knows all things in a universal manner, outside time, but does not know particulars whose renewed apprehension would entail a change in the essence of the knower.”

Al-Ghazālī mentioned that they agreed that He does not know particulars distinguished by the divisions of time into what is, what was, and what will be. He said:

“As for those among them who hold that He knows only Himself, the falsity of this position is evident. As for those who hold that He knows what is other than Himself, as Ibn Sīnā chose to maintain, they claim that He knows things through a universal knowledge that is outside time and does not vary with the past, the future, or the present. Yet Ibn Sīnā also claimed that not an atom’s weight in the heavens or on earth escapes His knowledge, except that He knows particulars in a universal manner.”

I say:

Abū al-Barakāt, the author of al-Muʿtabar, has a discussion of knowledge in which he refuted Aristotle and defended the view that He knows both universals and particulars.