As for knowledge that what is willed will occur, this is not established merely by what he has mentioned. For this is knowledge of a fact, whereas the other concerns what is intended. Then, once this knowledge is established, a doubt arises: is it identical to knowledge that the thing has occurred once it occurs, or not?

The theologians discussed these two kinds of knowledge and sought to identify one with the other. They were thus closer to the truth than those who identified knowledge of what one wills with knowledge that what is willed will occur, and identified that in turn with knowledge that it has already occurred.

It is therefore clear that the theologians’ approach presents fewer difficulties and is closer to the truth.

It may also be said to him:

When the One who knows what He wishes to do carries it out, His knowing that it will occur and then knowing that it has occurred does not prevent eternal knowledge from being a condition of the known thing’s existence and part of the full cause of its existence. If His essence necessarily entails His knowledge of what exists, conditional upon His bringing it into existence—as with His hearing and sight—then none of His states is caused by anything other than Him.

Thus, his assertion, “It follows that eternal knowledge is an effect of existence rather than its cause,” does not follow.

As for his denial of change, he has challenged the theologians’ proof for denying it without himself presenting any proof for its denial. His denial therefore remains entirely unsupported, except for his statement:

“It follows that eternal knowledge is an effect of existence rather than its cause.”

This is not correct. For even if a second knowledge arises, the knowledge by virtue of which the agent acts does not thereby cease to be a cause.

Furthermore, Allah’s knowledge is inseparable from His essence, and He is the One who brought existing things into being. Thus, if it is said: