It has thus become clear that if infinite succession means that, alongside every event, another event comes into existence concurrently, with the completion of its causal efficacy coming into existence alongside the other event, and so on, then this is impossible. It is of the same kind as Mu‘ammar’s doctrine of an infinite succession of ma‘ānī (meanings). If, however, it means that every event is preceded by another event, and so on, then there are two views on this; the leading Muslim scholars and the leading philosophers regard it as possible.

Just as infinite succession may refer to a succession of causes or to a succession in the completion of causal efficacy, and may be successive—one thing after another—or concurrent—one thing alongside another, so too our statement that a cause necessarily entails its effect may mean that the effect follows directly upon it. This is the entailment recognized by most rational people. On this understanding, nothing in the world can be beginningless.

People hold two views concerning a cause’s necessary entailment of its effect.

Those who maintain that an event comes into existence within the agent without a newly occurring cause say that a complete cause need not have its effect alongside it; rather, the effect may be delayed. They also say that an agent possessing power and free choice favors one of the two alternatives within his power merely by his beginningless power, or merely by his beginningless will, even if no cause newly arises when the event comes into existence.

The second view is that a complete cause necessarily entails its effect.

There are, however, two views as to the meaning of this entailment: