the foremost speculative thinkers, and as has been explained at length elsewhere. I have also devoted a separate work to divine oneness.

These speculative thinkers argued:

If two equal lords are posited, they could disagree, with one willing to do the opposite of what the other wills. In that case, either the will of one would be fulfilled, or the will of both, or the will of neither.

All three possibilities are false, so the premise that entails them must be false.

As for the first: if the will of both were fulfilled, two opposites would necessarily coexist. The same thing would be alive and dead, moving and stationary, capable and incapable, if one willed one of the two opposites and the other willed its opposite.

As for the second: if the will of neither were fulfilled, both would necessarily be powerless, which contradicts lordship.

Moreover, if the subject must possess one or the other of the two opposites, this would entail the absence of both mutually exclusive alternatives—such as motion and rest, or life and death—from something that cannot be without one or the other.

If the will of one prevailed but not that of the other, the one whose will prevailed would be the Lord possessed of power, while the other would be powerless and not a lord. Thus, they would not be equal.