He said:

“The weakness in this argument is that, just as reason allows that they might disagree, by analogy with willing agents in the observable world, it also allows that they might agree—and agreement is more befitting divinity than disagreement.

If they agreed to make the world, they would be like two craftsmen who agreed to make some object. If this were so, it would have to be said that their actions—even if they agreed—would obstruct one another, since both would act upon the same object. Someone might, however, say: ‘Perhaps one would make one part and the other another part, or perhaps they would take turns.’ Yet raising such doubts is not appropriate for the general public.

The answer to any dialectician who raises doubts on this point is that whoever has the power to bring part into existence has the power to bring the whole into existence. This brings us back to their both having power over all things. They would therefore either agree or disagree; in either case, their actions would all obstruct one another.