to care for what is here below and are made subservient to us. Whatever is made subservient and commanded must necessarily have been brought into being by another.”

I say:

This is established by showing that the motions of the celestial spheres do not originate from the spheres themselves, but from a mover distinct from them, so that this mover is the one who commands them and makes them subservient.

This can be demonstrated in several ways explained at length elsewhere. For example, the mover can be established both in terms of agency and causation and in terms of purpose and final end. That is, through their motions they must seek something distinct from themselves.

Thus Muslims and adherents of other religions say that they worship Allah Most High, while philosophers—such as Aristotle and his followers—say that they seek to resemble God as far as they are able.

On either account, their motion is of the same kind as the movement of a lover toward the beloved, or of a seeker toward what is sought. Whatever has an object of desire distinct from itself and independent of it needs something that has no need of it. Whatever needs something that has no need of it is not self-sufficient, but depends on something distinct from itself. Such a thing cannot be necessary in existence through itself; rather, it is contingent—a servant, dependent and in need. Thus the heavens are dependent and contingent, not necessary in existence.

The second line of argument is that each celestial sphere is moved by other celestial spheres distinct from it, so its motion comes from something other than itself. The sphere that encompasses and moves them neither moves nor influences anything else except with the assistance of other things distinct from it. Thus it alone is not the mover