an originating agent. Then say that the First is contingent, produced and made, and dependent upon an originating agent.

If the proof has established a being that is necessary in itself and has no need of anything else, then this must be either the celestial sphere or something above it. If it is the celestial sphere, and the sphere longs for a state over which its will has control, your denial of this concerning what is necessary in itself is invalid.

If, however, the being necessary in itself is something above the celestial sphere, then it is the agent that brings the sphere into being. In that case, the sphere and everything within it depend upon Him in every respect. Nothing in existence lies outside His dominion, such that it could be said that He longs for something over which His will has control.

Sixth:

This argument would hold only if there were something in existence over which the will of the First had no control. But if everything other than Him comes into being through His will and volition, then nothing in existence lies beyond the control of His will.

You have offered no proof that His willing is impossible. If His willing is possible in this manner—as the Muslims say, “Whatever Allah wills comes to pass, and whatever He does not will does not come to pass”—then nothing precludes His willing in this manner.

Seventh:

It may be said: Describing Him as acting by nature, or anything similar, is not the terminology of the Muslims. If they call everyone who performs an act subsisting in himself “moving by nature,” we do not dispute the meaning with them. But we ask: Why do you say that anyone who, by his will, performs an act subsisting in himself longs for a state over which he has no control?