And several groups hold that it is possible. These include a group of Mu‘tazilites known as the Proponents of Meanings, followers of Mu‘ammar ibn ‘Abbād, who maintain that an act of creation itself has an act of creation, and so on without end. These, however, affirm an infinite succession occurring at a single instant—an infinite succession in what is required to complete causal action—which is false. This possibility is also affirmed by groups among the adherents of the Sunnah and hadith, such as those who say that motion necessarily accompanies life and that every living being moves; those who say that He has always spoken whenever He wills; and others.

Since there are two positions on this matter, either such an infinite succession is possible, or knowledge of its impossibility depends on subtle reasoning.

Rather, a decisive answer can be given in several ways, which we have explained at length elsewhere. One is the answer already mentioned: whether causal action has positive existence or lacks it, and whether an infinite succession is possible or impossible, their use of this argument to establish the eternity of the world is invalid.

Alternatively, one may say: if an infinite succession of effects is possible, the argument fails, since the world could originate through originated causal action, even if this entails an infinite succession. If such a succession is impossible, it follows that originated events occur without an infinite succession of causal action, which likewise invalidates the argument. Thus, the argument is invalid on either supposition. This is a concise and comprehensive answer.

The argument rests on the claim that originated events necessarily require causal action having positive existence. If that causal action is itself originated, an infinite succession follows, which is impossible; if it is beginningless, the effect must likewise be beginningless.

The reply is therefore: if an infinite succession of effects is possible, the argument fails, since the world could originate from originated causal action, which in turn arises from originated causal action, and so on. The impossibility of an infinite succession is one of the argument’s premises; if its premises are invalid, the argument is invalid. If, however, an infinite succession is impossible, it follows that originated events have arisen from beginningless causal action having positive existence. In that case, the world could originate through beginningless causal action without an infinite succession of originated events. This is precisely what was to be established.