Third:

It may be asked: What prevents Him from loving and willing something He has produced and made? This does not make Him the effect of another, for that other is His effect in every respect, produced by Him in every way, and dependent upon Him in every regard.

For a being to love and will something of this kind is no imperfection; rather, it is a perfection. Whoever wills something that he himself produces and causes, while having power over what he wills and loves, possesses the utmost perfection. This is unlike one who does nothing distinct from himself, neither wills it nor has power over it, and indeed performs no act subsisting in himself. Rather, he is like an inanimate thing possessing no attribute of perfection—indeed, like something nonexistent.

Fourth:

Your statement, “This is utterly unfitting for the First Principle,” is an assertion without demonstration, yet you lay claim to demonstration and proof. As others have pointed out, you were not content to classify such discourse as rhetoric, but ranked it below rhetoric. Yet you make it your mainstay in so momentous a matter, without any proof whatsoever. Moreover, you have not established that the First is a principle or an agent at all, except insofar as it is an object of love—and you have offered no evidence even for that.

Fifth:

His statement:

“Anything possessing by nature what it has, in accordance with the direction toward which it tends, must have within its substance a natural longing for a state over which its will has no control.”

They may be answered:

This is a universal proposition for which they have offered no evidence. The most they can offer by way of proof is to say:

“We have found things that move by will—namely, animals—to be like this.”

They may be answered:

You have likewise found such a thing to be contingent, produced and made, and dependent upon