They may also be answered as follows:

Second: Why could what this essence produces, and which depends upon it, not be what calls and draws it? This would not entail dependence on something independent of it, and you have offered no proof ruling this out.

Third: Why could He not Himself be the principle of what He does, with the impetus coming from Himself rather than another, while He loves Himself? Your leading authorities have stated in their books that He is lover, beloved, and love, and that He is delightful and an object of delight.

He said:

“In sum, anything possessing something by nature, according to the natural orientation that it effaces, must have within its substance a natural longing for a state over which its will has no control. The one who longs is, with respect to his longing, an effect of the object longed for, which is the principle of that longing in him and, in some respect, his final cause.

“This is utterly unfitting for the First Principle. Rather, it is the principle of every nature, every longing, and every motion.”

He may be answered on several grounds:

First: Your statement that the First is the principle of every nature, every longing, and every motion contradicts what you have said. You have made Him nothing more than an object of love—not an agent who brings things into being, nor an efficient cause. Merely being loved does not entail producing any effect in something else. The distinction between an efficient cause and a final cause is well known.

Second: You say that the object of longing is a cause of the one who longs.

You may be asked: Why should it be impossible for Him to love Himself? He would then be both the lover and the beloved.