those of its states and affairs that cannot exist all at once, with events distinct from it then following from that, just as you have said of the celestial sphere?”

[The Twenty-Third Argument]

It may be said:

When you say, “It has no longing for anything and no aversion to anything,” do you mean that it has no love whatsoever—neither for itself nor for anything else—and no hatred of anything, calling the love that prompts action “longing”? Or do you mean that it has no longing for anything of which it has no need, as you have said of the celestial sphere?

If you mean the latter, this poses no difficulty, although you have offered no proof of it.

Were you told, “Rather, it may long for something else, and that other thing may long for it,” you would be unable to answer. For if you say that the celestial sphere is contingent in itself, it follows that the First must be what brings it into being and must be like the celestial sphere—yet, according to you, it neither acts nor produces any effect. If, however, the celestial sphere is necessarily existent, then a necessary existent is characterized by longing for something other than itself.

Moreover, you have offered no proof of its existence, let alone its freedom from need. Your proof of its existence rests on the claim that whatever moves by will can move only out of love for something other than itself. Yet you have offered no proof of this, and the argument cannot succeed unless the First’s acting by will is ruled out. Thus, you cannot establish its existence until its acting by will is ruled out, and its acting by will cannot be ruled out until its existence is known. Neither claim, therefore, is established.

If you mean the former, you may be asked:

How do you know that it cannot love itself or anything else?