in a way that gives him anything further, since the agent that produces love for the beloved and impels the lover towards the beloved is not the beloved himself. Every rational person knows that when a hungry person loves bread, the bread does not cause his movement or his intention. Likewise, a beloved who is unaware of his lover performs no act or movement through which the lover gains anything further. Action is attributed to the beloved only as it is attributed to inanimate things.

Thus it is said:
“Dirhams and dinars have ruined people.”

And:
“The love of wealth has killed me.”

Gold is called “a killer,” and this world is described as “beguiling, deceptive and scheming.” Similar descriptions are attributed to things that souls love and desire, although those things neither act nor intend anything. An action is attributed to such a thing only because it happened on its account—not because that thing brought the action about, performed it or originated it. Rational people agree on this.

That being so, the corporeal substance of the celestial sphere possesses only attributes of the same kind as those you ascribe to the First. It is self-sufficient just as the First is self-sufficient. Nevertheless, it can move and have events arise within it; the same, therefore, applies to the First.

If it is permissible to say that the celestial sphere moves of itself, why should it not be permissible to say that it longs for itself?

If it is said that the First is beloved and an object of longing, why should it not be possible for it to love itself and for its motion to arise from its love for itself?

If you say:
“Towards what does it move?”

you may be asked:
“And towards what does the celestial sphere move?”

If you say:
“To bring into actuality those locations and positions that cannot exist all at once,”

you may be asked:
“Why, on this account, should it not be permissible for you to say that the First moves in order to bring into actuality