And when they are divided into those that act by volition, those that act [without] volition, and those that act in neither way, whatever acts by volition is more perfect than whatever acts without volition, and whatever acts without volition is more perfect than whatever does not act at all. Yet you have made it something that acts neither by volition nor without volition.
[Thirteenth Argument]
You say:
“Thus, this cause produces no effect and performs no act arising from its volition and purpose, nor any act without its volition, since this essence has no deficiency requiring completion from outside itself, nor is there anything above its substance from which it might derive an increase in any aspect of its condition”—and so forth.
The response to you is this: If we posit an essence that acts and produces effects by volition, and another that neither acts nor produces effects, whether by volition or without it, sound reason plainly testifies that the former is more perfect. This is why an animal is more perfect than an inanimate object.
You yourselves have said that the celestial sphere’s motion is voluntary, and that this is more perfect than its motion being involuntary.
If we further suppose that what moves by volition needs completion from outside itself and moves in pursuit of that completion, it is nevertheless more perfect than what cannot receive completion, such as an inanimate object. Thus, if, according to you, the First has no awareness, no volition, and no voluntary action, and cannot possess any of these, then whatever moves by volition in pursuit of its completion is more perfect than this deficient being, stripped of the attributes of perfection and incapable of possessing them. The blind, the lame, the deaf, and those both mute and blind are therefore more perfect than this First that you have posited, while the celestial sphere is far more perfect than it. The contradictions and utter absurdity in what you have said are beyond the reckoning of anyone but the Lord of all His servants.
[Fourteenth Argument]
It may be said: The world is either necessarily existent in its own right