Aristotle says, ‘The first moving being moves everything in the universe only through longing—the longing felt for it by that which moves,’ and so on.”

The response is: This is incoherent and contradictory. According to you, the celestial sphere wills what it does and produces by its nature, even though what it produces exists alongside it. You have likened the activity of the First Cause to that of the celestial sphere, yet you then say that the First Cause has neither will nor causal influence. This comparison contradicts the distinction you draw.

[Ninth Argument]

It may be said: Either the celestial sphere acts voluntarily or it does not.

If the former is true—as you maintain—and its act exists alongside it, then a voluntary act can coexist with its agent without coming after it.

This invalidates your claim that the celestial sphere’s necessary coexistence with the First Cause entails that the First Cause performs no voluntary act in bringing the world into existence. For you have then affirmed an agent acting voluntarily whose act exists alongside it.

As for your statement, “Just as it does not bring its own substance into existence,” this analogy is utterly unsound. That which is necessarily existent in itself cannot bring itself into existence, whereas it must bring its effect into existence. How, then, can it be said, “It does not produce its effect, just as it does not produce itself”?

If, on the other hand, the celestial sphere does not act voluntarily, then it cannot be described as longing and loving, and the existence of the First Principle is no longer established. Thus, the foundation on which you based your affirmation of the First Cause and the eternity of the world collapses.

[Tenth Argument]

Your statement, “The First Cause should be regarded, in its substance