And if an eternal being can possess will and longing, then the First can possess will and longing despite being eternal, and can produce the world through a voluntary act. This too refutes your position.

[Fifth Argument]

It may be said: An eternal being either can possess will or cannot.

If it cannot, then the world cannot be both eternal and endowed with will. In that case, you no longer have any argument establishing the First Principle, for you established it only as the object of longing for the world, which, despite being eternal, moves voluntarily. If an eternal being cannot possess will, it no longer follows that there must be an eternal object of longing, and thus no proof of its existence remains.

If, however, an eternal being can possess will, then the First can possess will, and your assertion that the First Cause performs no voluntary act of creation is refuted.

You therefore face two alternatives: either deny will to the eternal world or affirm it of the eternal First. Whichever you affirm, your position is invalidated by the falsity of your position, and your way, Allah willing, against their factions.

[Sixth Argument]

Rather, as a sixth argument, it may be said: If you affirmed will of the eternal First and denied it to the celestial sphere, as some adherents of revealed religions do, this would be more reasonable than affirming it of the sphere while denying it to the First Cause. For clear reason recognizes that the First Cause and Principle is more entitled to possess will than the secondary effect. If action does not entail will, then the movement of the celestial sphere does not entail will. If it does entail will, then the efficient cause is more entitled to possess will than the effect it produces.

Do you not see that effects may be insentient, like the elements and plants, which possess no will?