longed for entails the existence of that which longs for it. Rather, the reverse is true: the object of longing has no need of that which longs for it, whereas that which longs needs the object of its longing.

Accordingly, the First, the object of longing, could exist without the world that longs for it; the world could then come into existence afterward, without this detracting from the perfection of the object of longing.

If you say, “What, then, would necessitate the world’s existence afterward?”

You may be answered: “The same thing that, according to your principles, necessitates its existence beforehand. For you have not established an originating agent that brought the world into existence. Accordingly, there is no difference between its existing earlier or later, unless you say that it is necessarily existent in itself.”

If you say that the world is necessarily existent in itself despite its need for the beloved, which has no need of it, your position becomes still more contradictory.

[The Third Ground]

We shall explain this through the third ground. We say: If you affirm the world and its cause, which it loves and must resemble, with the world moving to actualize its spatial locations and configurations because this is the utmost resemblance to its cause, then you must either say, “This is necessarily existent in itself,” or say, “One of the two is contingent in itself and exists only through that which is necessarily existent in itself.”

If you take the first position, it follows that the world, which needs its beloved, is necessarily existent in itself, despite being caused in this respect, possessing will and longing, and producing effects and performing acts through will.