it pursues must necessarily have within its substance a natural longing for a state over which its will has no control. Whatever longs for something is causally dependent upon the object of its longing in respect of that longing. The object longed for is the source of its longing and, in some respect, a cause of its completion.

This is wholly unfitting for the First Principle. Rather, it is the principle of every nature, every longing, and every movement.

[The Unsoundness of Another Statement of His on Several Grounds. The First Ground]

The Unsoundness of Another Statement of His on Several Grounds

The First Ground

These are his words. Someone might respond:

In this statement he has disclosed his position and doctrine, revealing contradictions and errors whose description and enumeration would take a long time.

This can be explained on several grounds:

Aristotle’s statement:

“The First Mover is the cause of everything in the universe through longing. The object of longing arouses longing only by virtue of its nature, not its will, for the beloved object of longing may be asleep or lack will, yet still move whoever longs for it and loves it. Nevertheless, the First Cause, in its substance and all its other aspects, should be held to possess the most perfect mode of existence possible for anything. Thus, it produces no effect and performs no act, either by its will or without its will”—and so on to the end of his statement.

He may be answered:

You have explicitly stated that the First has no action, whether by will or without will, and has no effect whatsoever upon the world except through being an object of love and longing. Yet the beloved object of longing need not be aware of the one who loves it, nor have any will concerning that lover, nor be capable of performing any act upon it. Indeed, even inanimate things are loved and longed for, just as