the world, just as it has no agency in the existence of its own substance. For the world’s existence cannot come after the existence of the substance of the First Cause; rather, its existence necessarily accompanies the existence of the First Cause. The First Cause would thus be a natural cause of the world and bring it to completion. The reasoning here would be analogous to that concerning what the celestial sphere does and brings about by its nature, since these effects coexist with the substance of the celestial sphere. This is especially so since Aristotle says that the First Mover causes the motion of everything in the universe through longing.

Thus, on the face of it, it is more reasonable that the object of longing should attract longing by virtue of its nature rather than its will. For the beloved object of longing may be asleep or lack will, yet still move whoever longs for it and loves it. Nevertheless, the First Cause, in its substance and all its other aspects, should be held to possess the most perfect mode of existence possible for anything.

Thus, the substance of this Cause produces no effect and performs no act contrary to its purpose and will, nor apart from its will. For there is no deficiency in this essence requiring completion from outside it, nor anything above its substance from which it might derive any enhancement of its condition, nor does anything befall it that it needs to ward off.

Its substance, then, contains no longing for anything, no aversion to anything, no susceptibility to change, and no capacity for a new condition to arise in it.

There is, then, nothing that occurs to this essence by nature and without will. Nor is there anything that draws this essence into a state or condition of which it is not itself the first principle and cause.

In short, whatever possesses a nature in the natural manner that