do so? And what was the cause determining when it would bring subsequent events into existence? For one thing after another continually comes into existence within it. What, then, necessitates the delay of these events, which previously had not occurred?

Whatever answer he gives to this will serve as an answer to his own objection.

If he says, “So that the conditions necessary for these events to occur may be fulfilled,” then he has admitted that the act of the Necessary Being may depend for its completion on conditions that come into existence.

It would then be permissible to say: “What necessitates the delay in His creating the world is that the conditions for His bringing it into existence must be fulfilled.” For, on this supposition, the act of the Being necessary in Himself may depend upon the conditions under which it occurs.

If he says, “The world is contingent,” he is told:

“Then it must have a Necessary Being who brought it into existence. In that case, He brought it into existence as it actually is, with events occurring later. What, then, necessitated that the agent delay the events He brings into existence? What prompted Him to bring these events into existence after they had not existed? And what cause impelled the agent to do so?”

Furthermore, they may be asked:

“If the world is contingent and proceeds from the Necessary Being, what necessitated that the First produce it? And what prompted Him to do so?”

If they say, “His abstract essence alone necessitated this,” they are told:

“If His essence necessitates whatever proceeds from it, and none of its activity depends upon anything other than the abstract essence, then everything proceeding from it must coexist with it. Whatever proceeds from what proceeds from it must likewise coexist with its source. In that case, nothing could arise subsequent to the world; rather, the whole of it would be