outwardly differ from the Muslims, as in the case of Ibn Sīnā and others.
In any event, a contingent thing that does not exist through itself must have a cause that necessitates its existence—indeed, one that necessitates its attributes and motions. The mere existence of what it loves does not suffice for its own existence. Rather, there must be a cause that necessitates its being and attributes, and indeed its very love.
Furthermore, if it is said that it loves something separate from itself, it follows that it depends upon what it loves.
But to claim that the mere object of its love is its originator, necessitating its being, attributes, and actions, without the beloved entailing, necessitating, or originating anything, but simply by virtue of being loved—this is something whose falsity is immediately evident to reason.
They, like every rational person, distinguish between the final cause and the efficient cause. The existence of an object of love establishes a final cause, but an efficient cause is also necessary. If they make the object of love the efficient cause, it follows that it is also its originator—which is precisely what is to be established. On that assumption, they can then be addressed with arguments demonstrating the falsity of their position.
If they do not make it its originator, they have no proof establishing an efficient cause for the existence of the world.
They may also be told:
The contingent thing’s dependence upon an originator of itself, its attributes, and its motion is more evident than its dependence upon an object of love.
Thābit ibn Qurra said:
“Aristotle rejects this newly introduced view. Many people suppose that Aristotle’s view that the world is everlasting entails that, in its substance, it is not caused by a cause external to it. This supposition is false.”
He may be answered:
Those who hold this supposition say that this is a necessary consequence of Aristotle’s position, because he did not establish that the world is caused by an efficient cause that originates it, even if it is coeval with that cause. Rather, he merely