It may then be said:

Either moving bodies—or some of them—are necessary in themselves, or none of them is necessary in itself.

If any of them is necessary in itself, their claim that what is necessary in itself—namely, the First Cause—cannot move is invalidated. For on this assumption, something necessary in itself has been acknowledged to be moving. They would then have no remaining way to establish an unmoved mover, since what is necessary in itself could be moving.

If none of the moving bodies is necessary in itself, it follows that all the moving celestial spheres are contingent and dependent upon a necessary existent that acts as their agent and originator, whether they are said to be eternal or to have come into existence. For the contingent must have an agent, whether it is said to be eternal or to have come into existence, since it does not exist through itself.

If it were said to have neither an agent nor an originator, it would be necessary in itself. A thing therefore exists either through itself or through something else. The first is what is contingent in itself, and the second is what is necessary in itself.

Some who have disputed with them have maintained that the contingent cannot be coeval with the Necessary Existent, but must be posterior to it. Our purpose here, however, is not to dispute this point with them. Rather, we proceed on their stated assumption that the contingent is coeval with the Necessary Existent, while being its effect, necessitated by it and proceeding from it. They call the Necessary Existent a cause, an originator, and an agent. They may also call it a bringer into existence, but this designation is used by some among them who outwardly profess Islam, so as not to