Moreover, they have not even mentioned the originator of contingent, moving bodies—unless, indeed, they hold that the moving celestial bodies are necessary in themselves and yet depend upon the First Mover.

This is, in fact, Aristotle’s position, and it involves an even greater contradiction. For if the celestial bodies are assumed to be necessary in themselves, yet move with a motion in which they depend upon something else, then something necessary in itself would be moving and dependent upon another for its motion.

In that case, it would be all the more possible for it to move without depending upon anything else for its motion. For they would then have affirmed both something necessary in itself that does not move at all, and something necessary in itself that depends for its motion upon an object of love other than itself, without which it cannot subsist.

Affirming something necessary that moves without depending upon another for its motion would therefore be all the more possible. Both are moving, but one depends upon something else, whereas the other has no need of it.

On this supposition, they have posited two things necessary in themselves: one that does not depend upon anything else, and another that does.

Thus, if something necessary were supposed to move by itself and for its own sake, without depending upon anything else, this would be all the more admissible. Any objection to this would apply still more forcefully to what they themselves affirm. Their full discussion of this will be presented later, including their assertion:

“A body cannot move by itself with a motion that has no end.”

That is one issue. There is a second issue here: although they affirm that the action is an effect, they establish this only on the grounds that it requires an object of love that serves as the principle of voluntary motion by being its end, not its agent. Nothing in this indicates that the celestial sphere has an efficient cause that brings it into being, as is clear to any rational person.