[Ibn Taymiyya’s Commentary]

I say:

One might reply: Rather, Ibn Sīnā knew that his position could not stand without the conception of divine oneness he asserted, which entails denying the Lord’s attributes and the acts that subsist in Him. Those Mu‘tazilites who agreed with him on this enabled him to gain the upper hand over them, exposing the inconsistency of their positions, although his own position was even more inconsistent in another respect.

Yet he came to argue against their position on the basis of their shared denial of Allah’s attributes—the foundational principle of the Jahmiyya.

This is indeed how matters stand. The argument for the eternity of the world relied upon by Aristotle and his followers, such as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and others like them, cannot hold without denying the acts that subsist in the Lord—indeed, His attributes as well. If this premise is challenged, their argument collapses. If it is conceded, however, they acquire an argument against those who concede it, although there is an argument against them from another angle.

Thus, on the question of the eternity of the world, those who deny the Lord’s voluntary acts subsisting in Him ultimately fall into either perplexity and suspension of judgment, or obstinate denial and sophistry: they are caught either in doubt or in falsehood.

This is why al-Rāzī appears to suspend judgment on this question at the culmination of his inquiry and reflection, as is evident in al-Matālib al-‘Āliya. At other times, he favors one position—as when he favors eternity in al-Mabāhith al-Mashriqiyya—or the other, as when he favors temporal origination in his theological works.

Ibn Sīnā urged adherence to the premise that entails denying the Lord’s attributes and the acts that subsist in Him. He then presented the two positions concerning the world’s eternity and temporal origination, favoring eternity himself but leaving the reader to choose, after conceding the premise on which he bases his argument against those who affirm temporal origination.