and any one of them requiring infinitely many things to be traversed before it can be reached, that is a false claim.

For when we say that something “depended on such-and-such,” we mean that both things were nonexistent together, and that the second could not come into existence until the first effect had come into existence. The same applies to need.

Yet at no time whatsoever could it correctly be said that the last member depended on infinitely many things coming into existence, or required infinitely many things to be traversed before it could be reached. Rather, whatever time you posit, you will find only finitely many things between it and the coming into existence of the last member. Such is its condition at all times, especially since, in your view, the whole and each individual are one and the same.

If by this dependence you mean that this came into existence only after things whose number cannot be counted, each existing at a different time, and that this is impossible, then this is precisely the point in dispute: whether it is possible or not. How, then, can it serve as a premise for refuting itself? By altering its wording in a way that leaves its meaning unchanged?’

They said:

‘Considering what we have drawn attention to, it must therefore follow that the Maker, whose existence is necessary, is unvarying in His relations to times and to the things that come into being from Him in a primary manner,