This is why many Muslims—such as the Kullābiyyah and those who agree with them—affirm attributes for the Necessary Existent without affirming that temporally originated things subsist in Him. If your only argument against temporally originated things subsisting in Him is the same argument you use to deny His attributes, then there are very many proofs that your position is false.
It then becomes clear that your denial of attributes and your treatment of distinct meanings as a single thing are false. Your claims that the lover, the beloved, and love are one and the same; that the one who understands, what is understood, and understanding itself are one and the same; that the knower is knowledge itself; and that power is will are among the most untenable claims. This was explained earlier, when we drew attention to your misleading the Muslims and discussed what you call composition. We showed that—even if we were to accept your flawed terminology—you have no argument for denying it. Your argument concerning causation is answered in the same way.
As for their assertion:
“If causation is eternal, the effect must be eternal. If it is temporally originated, then, if what originates is causation as a kind—and this is held to be possible—temporally originated things would have a beginning, and your doctrine would be invalid. If this is held to be impossible—which means that nothing comes into being until something has come into being—this is impossible by the agreement of all rational people, and may be called an infinite regress and circularity. If, however, what originates is the causation of a particular thing following a particular prior occurrence, this entails an infinite regress and temporally originated things subsisting in that which is eternal.”
They may be told:
“Causation either has positive existence or it does not. If it does not, the argument is invalid. This is al-Rāzī’s answer, and it is also the answer of those who say that creation is the created thing itself.
“If it has positive existence, it must subsist either in the essence of the causal agent or in something else. If it is