, while others affirm only one necessarily existent being.

As for the first group, they divided into three factions. The first comprises those who claim that this perceptible world is necessary in itself, with its shape, dimensions, and configuration just as they are.

The Shaykh said: ‘But if you recall what was said concerning the conditions of necessary existence, you will not find this perceptible world to be necessarily existent.’”

Al-Rāzī then presented arguments intended to establish that bodies are contingent. I have discussed these arguments and their weaknesses elsewhere. Thus, after presenting them, al-Rāzī said:

“This is the sum of the arguments establishing that bodies are contingent, and you already know the difficulties with each.”

The second position:

“The world has an essence and attributes. Its essence is that of bodies, which are necessary in themselves. Some, however, say that its essence is prime matter, which is the substratum of corporeality and is necessary in itself. As for its attributes—shape, dimensions, occupation of space, motion, and rest—all these are contingent.”

He said:

“This position, too, is invalidated by the aforementioned arguments demonstrating the falsity of the first premise.”

He said:

“The third position is that this world is contingent in both its essence and its attributes, yet there is nevertheless more than one necessarily existent being.

These people, too, fall into several factions. Some affirm two gods, each necessarily existent in itself, one good and the other