The error and contradiction apparent in this are greater than those apparent in the position of the former group.

If they counter this by appealing to what they posit as proceeding from the First and necessarily following from its essence, such as the first intellect and its necessary concomitants, this does not remove the untenable consequences of their position.

For whatever necessarily follows from its essence, while itself one, is subject to the same objection concerning the impossibility of diverse things and perpetually occurring temporal events proceeding from it. This is why they ultimately posit the active intellect and say:

“From it proceeded the lunar sphere and its soul, together with the elements beneath it, despite their differing kinds, attributes, and magnitudes, while it is itself simple.”

Then they say:

“The movements of the celestial spheres produced different dispositions for receiving what emanates from it.”

Yet the same argument applies to those differing movements as to everything else. They must therefore attribute things differing in kind, magnitude, and attributes, as well as temporal events differing in kind, magnitude, and attributes, to a simple essence devoid of any attribute or act subsisting in it, yet necessarily entailing everything that proceeds from it. This involves many times more contradiction and error than the position of the former group.

As for those philosophers who concede that attributes and voluntary acts subsist in the Lord, their position makes the temporal origination of everything other than Allah more evident, and the eternity of any part of the world still less tenable.

This is why the leading philosophers who held this principle are not known to have maintained the eternity of the form of the celestial spheres, for the first person known to have maintained the eternity of the form of the celestial spheres was