Fifth: Those speculative theologians who say that temporally originated things cannot subsist in that which is eternal say this only because, in their view, a succession of temporally originated things entails that whatever they subsist in must itself have come into being. If their position is correct, the celestial spheres, souls, and everything in which successive temporally originated things subsist must have come into being. This entails the invalidity of your argument, for it would then be possible for the world to proceed … had not existed, or things have always come into being one after another. The first alternative entails something coming into being without a temporally originated cause. This is invalid, as you yourselves stated in your argument, because it entails one possibility being favoured over another without a determining factor.

On the second alternative, nothing among contingent beings can be eternal, which contradicts your position.

If they say, “We do not regard temporally originated things subsisting in the Necessary Existent as impossible on the grounds that such things cannot subsist in that which is eternal—for we consider that possible—but rather because attributes do not subsist in Him,” they may be told:

“The matter then becomes straightforward. The overwhelming majority of adherents of religious traditions, Muslims and others—indeed, the majority of philosophers as well—disagree with you on this principle. Your denial of attributes is far weaker than the position of those who say that temporally originated things cannot subsist in that which is eternal.”