But the reply with which this group countered the other cannot be applied to the first temporal event, since no temporal event precedes it that could serve as a prerequisite for subsequent temporal events.

This, then, is the distinction these philosophers draw between the observable daily temporal events they affirm and what they deny: that temporal events had a beginning from which they arose.

This makes clear the falsity of both groups’ positions. Each group has demonstrated the falsity of the other’s position, not the soundness of its own. The falsity of one of two positions does not entail the soundness of the other unless the truth is confined to those two positions, which is not the case here.

[Al-Āmidī’s discussion in Abkār al-afkār]

Al-Āmidī also mentioned this argument in his book Abkār al-afkār. He said:

“The answer is that it is invalid, since sense perception, direct observation, and demonstrative proof attest to the existence of temporal events that come to be after not having existed.

“The specious argument they have advanced entails that temporal events cannot exist. Yet the claim that temporal events cannot exist is untenable, and any proof that entails an impossibility is itself invalid.

“This entailment can be demonstrated as follows: the very same alternatives and divisions they set out concerning the temporal origination of the world necessarily apply to the origination of every temporal event. Whatever answer they give concerning the origination of temporal events will equally serve as an answer in support of the temporal origination of the world in its entirety.”