its nonexistence. Whichever of the two is supposed to endure forever, its counterpart likewise endures forever; and whichever is supposed to obtain at a particular time, its counterpart likewise obtains at that time.

If something can remain in the same state in every respect and have an effect, it is not implausible that joy should necessarily proceed from it. If this is not called something produced because it was not preceded by nonexistence, there is no need to dispute terminology once the meaning is clear.

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s commentary]

The response is:

This argument rests on a supposition whose substance is that a complete cause, whose production of its effect does not depend on anything external to it, manifestly entails the existence of its effect. This differs from a cause whose production of its effect depends on external factors, such as an instrument, material, a motive, or something else. It also supposes that if something remains in the same state in every respect and has an effect, that effect would remain with it eternally.

But the question is whether this supposition can actually be established.

For you may be told:

At most, this refutes the position of someone who holds that the Lord creates the world without any cause whatsoever coming into being. This is the position of a group of speculative theologians affiliated with the religious communities. It is not the position of the leading authorities of those communities or their majority, who affirm that Allah is the Creator of everything and that He created the heavens and the earth in six days.

That being so, these people can press you with the following objection:

Can diverse, newly occurring things proceed from the cause you have described, whether through an intermediary or without one, or is that impossible?

If you do not allow this, your position collapses, and it follows that newly occurring things have no agent—which is necessarily free of invalidity.

If you do allow it, you are asked:

If, then, the agent is one and simple,