[Second Argument]
It may be said:

Does anything other than Allah depend on something else, or not?

If you say the latter, it follows that all existing contingent things are eternal—even temporally originated things. This is a denial of the obvious.

But if any of them depends on something else, your statement, “Nothing other than the Light of Lights depends on anything else,” is invalidated.

This is clarified by the following:

[Third Argument]
It may be said:

If the other thing that serves as a condition is assumed to come from Allah as well, and one of the two acts depends on the other, there is nothing objectionable in this. Allah has made some things conditions for the existence of others. The most that can be said here is, “This entails an infinite regress.”

The reply is: You regard this as possible. Thus, the eternity of any of the celestial spheres—or anything else—is not necessarily established.

[Fourth Argument]
It may be said:

If an infinite regress is impossible, your position is invalid; if it is possible, your argument is invalid.

[Fifth Argument]
It may be said:

You have made an infinite regress of temporal events necessary by affirming perpetual, uninterrupted motion. You have also said:

“Since the Light of Lights is everlasting, along with everything that those who affirm the attributes posit as an everlasting attribute, whatever proceeds from Him endures as long as He does, because it does not depend on anything yet to occur.”

Since your position and that of your fellows entail both claims, it may be said to you:

Perpetual motion either proceeds from Him, with or without an intermediary, or it does not proceed from Him. If it does not proceed from Him, temporally originated things must come into existence without the Necessarily Existent. This amounts to saying that temporally originated things come into existence without an originator. If, however, motion proceeds from Him, with or without an intermediary—which is their position—