otherwise He would depend on an external cause, which would entail His contingency. Thus, the perpetual existence of His reality entails the perpetual existence of that attribute.”

Those who maintain the beginninglessness of action argue in the same way. They say:

“His essence is either sufficient for it, or dependent on something else. If it is sufficient for it, the action must be beginningless, since its complete necessitating cause has existed from eternity. If it is not sufficient for it, He must depend on an external cause, which would entail His contingency.”

This is the argument on which they rely.

There are several responses to this.

First, it may be said: This invalidates your position and can be turned against you with respect to all events. If His essence is sufficient for events to come into being, they must be beginningless, which is impossible. If it is not sufficient, events must depend on something other than His essence.

Then consider that condition upon which events depend for their occurrence: if His essence is sufficient for it, it must be beginningless. Otherwise, the same argument applies to it as to the event conditioned upon it.

Whatever contingent thing is posited, it may be said that its coming into being depends on a preceding event, as with things known to have been brought into being.

If they say, “The source of events is the motion of the celestial sphere. Motion, by its very nature, is renewed successively, and the cause of this is the renewal of conceptions and volitions,” the response is:

This very claim invalidates your argument. For this thing, which is like His essence, is renewed successively. If the essence of the Necessary Existent alone were sufficient for its existence, it would necessarily have coexisted with Him from eternity, which is impossible.

It is therefore clear that His essence does not suffice for the existence of any part of it. Rather, each part is conditional upon what precedes it, and His essence does not necessitate any of these conditions.