Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (1/350)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

this contradiction is thus of the same kind as your assertion that He is powerful in the eternal past, although the existence of anything subject to His power is impossible in the eternal past. You also said:

“If He is receptive to temporally originated things in the eternal past, their existence in the eternal past must be possible.”

What difference, then, is there between the possibility of receptivity, the possibility of something subject to power, and the possibility of something brought into being? As for one thing’s precedence over another, and its being of this sort before the other’s time: even if the later thing does not coexist with the earlier, it does not follow that what is received, what is subject to power, and the effect cannot possibly exist alongside causal efficacy, power, and receptivity. One cannot therefore say:

“He is a creator although the existence of anything created is impossible; powerful although the existence of anything subject to His power is impossible; and receptive although the existence of anything received is impossible.”

Moreover, this answer is equivalent to that of those who say that temporally originated things come into existence through an eternal will. Their opponents have pressed them with the objection that this amounts to preference without a determining factor, as discussed earlier.

These object to al-Armawī’s answer, while those object that, when the temporally originated effect comes into existence, either complete causal efficacy newly arises or nothing newly arises. An infinite regress would follow, as discussed earlier; and if nothing newly arises, something temporally originated would arise without a temporally originated cause. This has already been refuted by explaining that an effect cannot fail to accompany its fully operative cause.

Al-Armawī could have answered, on his own principles, that the origination of bodies depends on the origination of successive conceptions in the intellect or the soul, as he answered the first argument.

[The purpose of the preceding discussion]

I say: The purpose here is to show the limits of what these thinkers have offered in answering the eternalists concerning this formidable difficulty and daunting predicament. What these answers entail will not escape an intelligent, discerning person.

فهذا التناقض من جنس قولكم إنه قادر في الأزل مع امتناع المقدور في الأزل، وقلتم: إذا كان قابلاً للحوادث في الأزل لزم إمكان وجود الحوادث في الأزل، فأي فرق بين إمكان القبول، وإمكان المقدور، وإمكان المفعول؟ وما تقدم الشيء على غيره وكونه مثل هذا قبل زمن هذا، ولكن لا يلزم إذا لم يكن المتأخر مع المتقدم ألا يكون المقبول المقدور والأثر ممكناً مع وجود التأثير والقدرة والقبول، حتى يقال: إنه خالق مع امتناع المخلوق، وقادر مع امتناع المقدور، وقابل مع امتناع المقبول. وأيضاً فإن هذا الجواب بمنزلة جواب من يقول: إن الحوادث توجد بإرادة قديمة، والمنازعون لهم ألزموهم بأن هذا ترجيح بلا مرجح، كما تقدم. فهؤلاء يعترضون على جواب الأرموي، وهؤلاء يعترضون عليه بأنه عند وجود الأثر الحادث: إما أن يتجدد تمام التأثير، وإما أن لا يتجدد شيء لزم التسلسل كما تقدم، وإن لم يتجدد لزم حدوث الحادث بدون سبب حادث، وقد تقدم إبطاله بأن المؤثر التام لا يتخلف عنه أثره. وكان الأرموي يمكنه أن يجيب ـ على أصله ـ بأن حدوث الأجسام موقوف على حدوث التصورات المتعاقبة في العقل أو النفس، كما أجاب به عن الحجة الأولي. [المقصود مما تقدم] قلت: المقصود هنا أن يعرف نهاية ما ذكره هؤلاء في جواب الدهرية عن المعضلة الزباء والداهية الدهاء، وما يخفي على العاقل الفاضل ما في هذه الأجوبة.