events, then at that time it is not characterized by the nonexistence of that event, such that a contradiction would follow. Rather, it is characterized by the nonexistence of all the other events. A contradiction follows only if something is characterized both by a particular event and by the nonexistence of that same event. But if, at that time, it is characterized by the existence of that event and the nonexistence of others, what contradiction is there in that?”

He said:

“This is the sum of what has been said on this question.”

I say:

These are al-Rāzī’s words on this matter. Yet his usual practice in the aforementioned book—which he composed on philosophy and which is his largest work on that subject—is to criticize the philosophers’ arguments whenever he finds grounds to do so. Thus, he criticized their claims that “From one, only one can proceed,” and that “One and the same thing cannot be both a recipient and an agent,” along with other claims open to his criticism. Likewise, when he finds grounds to substantiate an argument, he reinforces it with additions and refinements that the philosophers themselves did not mention. His approach thus depends on where his inquiry and reflection lead him.

For this reason, he sometimes counters the philosophers’ arguments with opposing arguments from the theologians, just as, in works on kalām, he counters what the theologians put forward with what he presents in refutation of the philosophers. He favors whichever position appears stronger to him at the time.

Yet, for all this, he set out these arguments, which are the mainstays of those who maintain that events do not continue perpetually, and on which