of events occurring: did it exist in past eternity or not? If it did, an eternal event could occur, which is impossible. If it did not, possibility would have a first beginning, which is impossible.

Since this argument does not undermine the beginninglessness of possibility, it does not undermine the position at issue here either.”

He said:

“The answer to their sixth argument—that whatever has entered existence is bounded by existence—is that being bounded means having an endpoint. We concede that events are bounded on the side nearest to us. But why do you say that this entails their being bounded on the side furthest from us? We then counter this with the possibility of events occurring.

“In answer to his seventh argument—that it does not follow that a body cannot be free of the occurrence of events and their nonexistence—we say: If you mean that it is characterized by the existence of all events and simultaneously by their nonexistence, that is false, for events do not exist as a whole such that the body could be characterized by their simultaneous nonexistence. That is false, for events do not exist as a whole such that the body could be characterized by that existence. But if you mean that at each moment it is characterized by one of those