at which this condition is stipulated. Anything of this kind would be impossible to bring into existence. But if this dependence means that this event cannot exist unless an infinite number of events have already existed before it, and it is then claimed that dependence in this sense is impossible, this is precisely what needs to be proved, for this alone is the point in dispute.

The answer to their third argument is that each individual having a beginning does not entail that the whole has a beginning. What holds for the whole may differ from what holds for its individual members. Each individual unit of ten is not ten, whereas the whole is ten. No individual part is the whole, whereas all the parts together constitute the whole. No individual daily event occupies the entire day, whereas all such events together occupy the entire day.

Indeed, we say that the whole, considered as a whole, cannot possibly be equal to its part, considered as a part. Otherwise, one would not be a whole and the other a part.

As for a single example, it does not suffice, because we do not claim that what holds for the whole must differ from what holds for its individual members, such that a single example would undermine our position. Rather, we say that such equivalence may or may not obtain; the matter depends on proof.”

He said:

“The answer to their fourth argument is that events reaching their endpoint with us entails that they have an endpoint in the direction nearest to us, and having an endpoint on one of