impossible. If it is possible, then either all that is required for its existence is present, or it is not.

The first supposition is that it is impossible because it entails an infinite regress of events.

The second is that, even supposing it possible, the Lord Most High’s will or power did not pertain to it, or His knowledge did not pertain to its existence before that time, or something else without which the action cannot exist was absent.

As for anyone who says, “Perpetual action is impossible,” they have refuted his position, as already mentioned.

As for anyone who says, “It is possible, but its conditions were not fully met,” they say to him:

“Then it was previously impossible, and subsequently became possible—indeed, actual—despite the two states being identical. This entails favoring one alternative without a determining cause.”

If he says, “It is possible, and that through which it occurs exists,” they say:

“Then its existence necessarily follows.”

After presenting this argument, al-Rāzī said:

“The principal argument of those who deny this is the impossibility of events having no beginning. We have already discussed this in the chapter on time, so we shall not prolong its discussion with their lengthy elaborations that go beyond the fundamental principles.”

[Al-Rāzī’s Discussion in al-Mabāhith al-Mashriqiyyah of the World’s Temporal Origination, and Ibn Taymiyyah’s Commentary]

Al-Rāzī’s Discussion in al-Mabāhith al-Mashriqiyyah of the World’s Temporal Origination, and Ibn Taymiyyah’s Commentary

In the passage to which he referred, he presented the arguments that he and others had advanced for the temporal origination of time, together with its implications for the temporal origination of motion and bodies, and refuted them all. He presented the arguments advanced by the Mu‘tazilites and the Ash‘arīs, as well as those he himself had presented in al-Arba‘īn and Nihāyat al-‘Uqūl concerning the temporal origination of the world, and refuted them all. He thus formulated for them