any determining factor whatsoever, as various groups among the Jahmiyya and the Mu‘tazilites, and those speculative theologians who follow them, maintain.

They say that when power and motive are present, the act does not become necessary; rather, both its existence and its nonexistence remain possible.

A group of Mu‘tazilite Karrāmīs say instead that, when the determining factor is present, existence becomes preponderant over nonexistence without actually occurring. This is the position of Mahmūd al-Khwārazmī, Ibn al-Haysam al-Karrāmī, and others.

The third position is that of various groups among Ahl al-Sunnah and the Mu‘tazilites, such as Abū al-Husayn: when complete power and a complete motive are present, the existence of the act within that power becomes necessary.

Those who hold the position adopted by Mahmūd say that, when the determining factor is present, the contingent thing is more likely to exist than not to exist, even though this preponderance does not reach the point of necessity. They regard the act of an agent endowed with power and choice in this light. On this basis, they debate others concerning divine decree and debate the philosophers concerning the world’s coming into existence.

Others, however, have demonstrated the unsoundness of their position. For if a determining factor is present, yet the contingent thing can either exist or not exist despite its presence, there must be something that gives one alternative preponderance over the other.

If it is asked, “Is the alternative of existence stronger or weaker?” the reply is: “When someone says ‘stronger,’ does he mean that, even with this strength, the thing can either exist or not exist, or that it must exist?”

If he affirms the latter, its necessity in the presence of the determining factor is established.