into existence infinitely many things within the Creator’s power. Otherwise, it would follow that the Lord was not capable and then became capable, or vice versa, without anything occurring to necessitate His transition from power to incapacity or vice versa.

This denies the Lord an attribute of perfection and affirms change without a cause to necessitate it, contradicting clear reason and revelation.

This is why the Muslims condemned these people’s claim:

“The Lord was not capable in pre-eternity and then became capable.”

This is among the claims on account of which Muslims deemed it permissible to curse certain speculative theologians to whom it was attributed. Anyone who acknowledges that the Lord, exalted is He, has always been and will always be endowed with the attributes of perfection is especially bound to describe Him as having always been, and as always remaining, capable. Power pertains only to what is possible; it follows that His acting must have always been, and must always remain, possible.

The assertion made by some of these people—“He was capable from eternity of what has always existed”—is contradictory.

For they are asked:

“When He was capable, was acting possible?”

They must answer, “No,” for that is their position.

They are then asked:

“How could He be described as having power when no act within His power was possible?”

Thus, it is clear that when acting is impossible, He cannot be described as “capable of acting.”

As for his statement:

“Affirming events while denying a beginning is contradictory,”

they reply:

“It is contradictory if a beginning is denied of that which itself has a beginning, namely, each individual event. But if a beginning is denied of that for which no beginning has been established—namely, events considered as a kind—there is no contradiction, as explained above.”