is unsound.

For a thing’s being causally effective in something else cannot follow its effect; it must either coincide with it or precede it. Otherwise, the effect would exist before the causal efficacy, which is impossible. Nor is there any need for this supposition, since it is far too evident that the regress here is a regress of effects to require even a sound proof of this kind, let alone this particular proof.

The answer he mentioned—that an attribute accruing to a thing in relation to something else depends only upon the existence of its bearer—is the answer given by those who hold that causal efficacy is eternal while the effect is temporally originated.

This is the position of those who affirm that Allah Most High possesses the attribute of creating and bringing into being from eternity, even though the created thing is temporally originated.

This position is held by groups among the followers of Abū Hanīfa, al-Shāfiʿī, and Ahmad, as well as speculative theologians and Sufis. It rests upon the view that the act of creation is distinct from the created thing, a view held by most groups. Some, however, explicitly state that the act of creation is eternal while the created thing is temporally originated; others explicitly state that acts occur anew; and the position of others on this matter is unknown.

What al-Baghī reported from Ahl al-Sunnah is the affirmation of the attribute of creation for Allah Most High, and that He has always been the Creator. Likewise, Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhī stated in his book al-Taʿarruf li-Madhhab al-Tasawwuf (An Introduction to the Sufi Doctrine) that this is the Sufis’ position. Al-Tahāwī and the other followers of Abū Hanīfa also stated this, and it is