and all other enduring things, as well as impossibilities that cannot exist.’ For the things subject to the Originator’s power and the things known to Him fall into two categories: existent and nonexistent. The existent things subject to His power and known to Him are all finite in number, whereas the nonexistent things among them are infinite and cannot admit increase or decrease.

“Since the matter is as we have explained, their claim is invalid.”

This, then, is what is presented by such men as the two judges, Ibn al-Labbān, or others.

This approach is the method of correspondence. It rests on the premise that infinite collections cannot differ in magnitude. The discussion and objections concerning it have been set out elsewhere. Our purpose here is merely to draw attention to people’s approaches to the foundational principles that some claim entail conclusions contrary to the revealed texts.

[Al-Juwaynī’s discussion in al-Irshād of the impossibility of originated events without a beginning]

Al-Juwaynī’s discussion in al-Irshād of the impossibility of originated events without a beginning

Some seek to establish the impossibility of a perpetual succession of originated events by treating it as self-evident. Various groups have taken this approach, including Abū al-Ma‘ālī in his al-Irshād, which he intended as a guide to conclusive proofs. He made the aforementioned argument from accidents the foundation of foundations, upon which he built all the principles of religion he discusses, and on the basis of which he declared those who disagreed with him unbelievers or innovators. In presenting this argument, he followed earlier speculative theologians who adopted the Mu‘tazilī approach to establishing it.

It rests on four pillars: establishing the existence of accidents, then establishing that they originate, then establishing that bodies cannot be devoid of them.

He said: “The fourth principle comprises an explanation of the impossibility of originated events without a beginning.”