of a determining factor. Thus, whoever acknowledges an originator acknowledges a determining factor, but not conversely. Whatever demonstrates the existence of an originator also demonstrates the existence of a determining factor, by agreement, whereas the converse is disputed.

Moreover, if someone were to dispute with him whether that which must come into existence may do so at one time rather than another, saying, “This is just like your own assertion that one who has power assigns it to one time rather than another,” he would need to answer.

If he says, “One who has power may favor one of two alternatives within his power without a determining factor, as with a hungry person or someone fleeing,” the objector replies, “Is this preference necessary or contingent?”

If he says, “Necessary,” the objector replies, “Then why is it confined to one time rather than another?”

If he says, “Contingent,” the objector replies, “Then its coming into existence, when it could have failed to do so, requires a further determining factor; otherwise, its coming into existence would be no more likely than its not doing so.”

If he says, “The knowledge that what is necessary in itself cannot be confined to one time rather than another is self-evident,” the objector replies, “The knowledge that a newly arisen thing must have an originator is also self-evident.”

If he claims that the latter is not self-evident but requires inference, the objector can counter by saying, “The knowledge that what is necessary cannot be confined to one time rather than another requires inference and is not self-evident.”

The purpose here is to draw attention to these people’s foundational principles, which are their mainstay and upon which they have built