Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (1/346)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

Thus, if it is said:

“He Himself is sufficient to bring into existence whatever He creates; His action does not depend upon any condition.”

The reply is:

“Yes, none of His actions depends upon anything other than Him. Rather, His producing each temporally originated thing depends upon an act subsisting in His own essence, immediately after which that thing comes into existence. That act, too, is conditional upon a temporally originated effect preceding it.”

It has thus become clear that, when these rational principles—which have perplexed the foremost speculative thinkers and which they regard as the foundations of metaphysics—are examined with the utmost thoroughness, they prove to accord with what the leading scholars of the Sunnah and hadith, who understand what the messengers brought, have said. It also becomes clear that the most refined rational insights serve, support, and bear witness to what the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, brought.

I say:

The point here is that al-Urmawī challenged the answer on the grounds that the objectionable infinite regress is a regress of causal agents—that is, causes—whereas a regress of effects is not objectionable. If causal efficacy is preceded by causal efficacy, only a regress of effects follows.

His statement that this entails a regress of effects, not of causal agents, is correct according to those who hold that an effect need not coexist with its causal agent in time, but instead follows immediately after it. For when causal efficacy is preceded by causal efficacy, what the earlier efficacy brings into being is only the agent’s being causally effective, not the causal agent itself.

The distinction between the causal agent itself and its act of causing is the distinction between the agent and his act, the originator and his act of origination, that which entails and its entailment, and that which necessitates and its necessitation. It is like the distinction between one who strikes and his striking, one who acts justly and his justice, and a benefactor and his beneficence. This is an evident distinction.

But his argument—that if causal efficacy is a relational attribute whose realization depends upon the causal agent and the effect, it may precede the effect just as it must follow the effect—

وحينئذ فإذا قيل: هو نفسه كاف في إبداع ما ابتدعه، لا يتوقف فعله على شرط. قيل: نعم كل ما يفعله لا يتوقف على غيره، بل فعله لكل مفعول حادث يتوقف على فعل يقوم بذاته يكون المفعول عقبه، وذلك الفعل أيضاً مشروط بأثر حادث قبله. فقد تبين أن هذه المعقولات التي اضطرب فيها أكابر النظار، وهي عندهم أصول العلم الإلهي، إذا حققت غاية التحقيق: تبين أنها موافقة لما قاله أئمة السنة والحديث العارفون بما جاءت به الرسل، وتبين أن خاصة المعقول خادمة ومعينة وشاهدة لما جاء به الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم. قلت: المقصود هنا أن الأرموي ضعف الجواب بأن التسلسل المنكر هو تسلسل المؤثرات التي هي العلل، وأما تسلسل الآثار فليس بمنكر، وإذا كانت المؤثرية مسبوقة بمؤثرية، لم يلزم إلا التسلسل في الآثار. وقوله: إن هذا يقتضي التسلسل في الآثار لا في المؤثرات كلام صحيح على قول من يقول: إن الأثر لا يجب أن يقارن المؤثر في زمان بل يتعقبه لأن المؤثرية المسبوقة بمؤثرية إنما حدث بالأولى كونها مؤثرة، لا نفس المؤثر. والفرق بين نفس المؤثر ونفس تأثيره هو الفرق بين الفاعل وفعله، والمبدع وإبداعه، والمقتضي واقتضائه، والموجب وإيجابه، وهو كالفرق بين الضارب وضربه، والعادل وعدله، والمحسن وإحسانه، وهو فرق ظاهر. لكن احتجاجه بأن المؤثرية إذا كانت صفة إضافية يتوقف تحققها على المؤثر والأثر جاز أن تكون متقدمة على الأثر، كما لزم أن تكون متأخرة عن الأثر: