If he says, “Because the states are equivalent,” he is told:

“The states are equivalent whether coming into existence is assumed to be necessary or contingent. A determining factor is therefore needed in either case.”

If he says, “What is necessary is not confined to one state rather than another, unlike what is contingent,” the reply is:

“This is true of what is necessary in itself. But knowing this is no more evident than knowing that a newly arisen thing does not come into existence by itself. Indeed, the former requires more explanation and clarification than the latter. For he previously argued that what is eternal necessarily exists in every state: since it exists from eternity, its existence cannot be contingent, nor can it result from an act; it must therefore be necessary. Yet he did not establish that what is necessary cannot be confined to one time rather than another.”

If he says, “This is self-evident and known by necessity,” he is told:

“If we put two questions to rational people—whether something necessary can be necessary at one time but not another, and whether a newly arisen thing can come into existence by itself—their rejection of the second would be stronger than their rejection of the first. What is more evident should not be established by what is less evident.”

This argument also has an advantage over the other in another respect. The later eternalist philosophers concerned with divine matters, such as Ibn Sīnā and others, say:

“What is necessary may be eternal while being necessary through another.”

Thus, according to them, what is necessary through another may not have come into existence, despite depending on a determining factor that necessitates it. Consequently, recognizing its dependence on a necessitating cause does not, on their account, entail that it has an originator. Yet none of them has said that something newly arisen can exist without an originator. And whoever does say this does not deny that what is singled out is in need