because no newly arising event can proceed from a complete cause that necessarily entails its effect, whether through an intermediary or without one.
Thus, these people likened His action to the action of inanimate things, despite the inconsistencies and inadequacies in their account of the action of inanimate things. The Qadariyyah likened His action to the action of animate beings, despite the inconsistencies and inadequacies in their account of the action of animate beings.
Those who affirm divine decree, among the Kullābiyyah and others, differ from the Muʿtazilah in affirming divine decree and on certain questions concerning the divine attributes. They identify the determining factor as the eternal will, which bears the same relation to all things willed. They say:
“It is characteristic of will to single out one of two equivalent alternatives rather than the other without a cause.”
For this reason, they founded their principles on the premise that singling out one of two times requires a determining factor.
The argument of Abū al-Husayn and those like him is more incisive than theirs in one respect, but more deficient in another. Insofar as he takes the very fact that something comes into existence rather than remaining nonexistent—although it might not have come into existence—as evidence of a cause bringing it into existence, his argument is stronger than that of someone who takes its being assigned one time rather than another as the evidence. For the very fact of coming into existence involves a determination sufficient to dispense with relating the newly arisen thing to particular times.
As for its deficiency, it falls short in another respect. He says:
“If it came into existence while its doing so was necessary, its coming into existence in that state would be no more appropriate than its coming into existence earlier. Thus, its coming into existence could not be fixed to any particular state, if its coming into existence were necessary.”
For, even setting aside the fact that coming into existence itself entails an originator—even if it is assumed to be necessary—he may be asked:
“If you assume that its coming into existence is necessary, why could its coming into existence not be more appropriate in one state than in another, and be necessary in that state rather than any other?”