Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

This, in fact, is the position of the Qadariyyah. Jahm himself, however, denied that the servant has power or any ability to act. Thus, if he says that an agent endowed with power and choice favors one of two alternatives within his power without a factor that favors it, his position would not be inconsistent on the basis of his own false premise.

As for al-Ashʿarī and others who say that the servant acquires his actions and possesses power, yet maintain that he is not truly an agent and that his power has no effect on what lies within its scope: if there is a substantive difference between their position and Jahm’s, they would need to distinguish between the Lord’s action and the servant’s action. Otherwise, their position would be the same as Jahm’s.

The majority of those who affirm divine decree, however, maintain that the servant possesses power and acts. This is the position of the early generations and the imams. They hold that the servant is an agent endowed with power and choice, but that he does not favor one of two alternatives within his power over the other without a factor that favors it. Al-Rāzī inclines toward their position, affirming that the servant possesses power and a motivating impulse, and that the two together necessarily entail the occurrence of the act.

These groups—the Kullābiyyah, Karrāmiyyah, and Ashʿariyyah, together with those scholars of hadith and jurisprudence and others who agree with them—although they differ from the Muʿtazilah to some extent, share with them the fundamental principle upon which the latter based their position on divine decree. They debate the philosophers who posit a cause that necessitates by its very essence, and the naturalists who maintain that the maker of the world is a complete, eternal cause that necessarily entails its effect.

This position is even more untenable. For what their position really amounts to is that the events arising in the world have no originator, just as the position of the Qadariyyah really amounts to saying that the actions of animate beings have no originator. Thus, what the Qadariyyah say about the actions of animate beings, these people say about all events arising in the world,

وهذا حقيقة قول القدرية. لكن جهم نفسه نفى كون العبد قادراً، ونفى أن يكون له قدرة على فعل. وحينئذ إذا قال: إن القادر المختار يرجح أحد مقدوريه بلا مرجح، لم ينتقض قوله بناءً على أصله الفاسد. والأشعري وغيره ممن يقول: إن العبد كاسب وله قدرة، ويقولون: ليس بفاعل حقيقة، ولا لقدرته تأثير في المقدور، إن حصل فرق معنوي بين قولهم وقول جهم، احتاجوا الى الفرق بين فعل الرب وفعل العبد، وإلا كانوا مثل جهم. وأما جمهور المثبتين للقدر، الذين يقولون: للعبد قدرة وفعل، وهذا قول السلف والأئمة، فعندهم أن العبد فاعل قادر مختار، وهو لا يرجح أحد مقدوريه على الآخر إلا لمرجح. والرازي يميل إلى قول هؤلاء، ويثبت للعبد قدرة وداعياً، وأن مجموعهما يستلزم وجود الفعل. فهؤلاء الطوائف من الكلابية والكرامية والأشعرية، ومن وافقهم من أهل الحديث. والفقه وغيرهم، وإن خالفوا المعتزلة بقدر، فهم يشاركونهم في الأصل الذي بنى أولئك قولهم في القدر عليه، وهم يناظرون الفلاسفة القائلين بالموجب بالذات، وأهل الطبع القائلين بأن فاعل العالم علة تامة أزلية تستلزم معلولها. وهذا القول أشد فساداً، فإن حقيقة القول هؤلاء أنه ليس لحوادث العالم محدث، كما أن حقيقة قول القدرية أنه ليس لفعل الحيوان محدث، فما قاله القدرية في فعل الحيوان، قاله هؤلاء في جميع حوادث العالم،

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