determination, whether newly originated or eternal, must have a determining factor that brings it about by choice. For, according to them, what is eternal cannot have an agent that brings it about. Thus, only newly originated determination remains, and the meaning becomes: every newly originated determination must have a determining factor—an agent acting by choice.

Newly originated determination is either coextensive with what comes into existence or narrower in scope. If it is coextensive with it, this would be like saying “a newly originated effect,” “a newly originated occurrence,” and similar expressions. If it is narrower in scope, this would amount to arguing that everything that comes into existence must have an originator because this particular kind of occurrence must have an originator.

Yet this particular kind is precisely what the argument seeks to establish. Thus, they would be arguing for this particular kind on the basis of the general category, and then for the general category on the basis of that particular kind. This would amount to using something as proof of itself.

But it may be said on their behalf:

“Although determination and coming into existence are coextensive, being a determination is a different aspect from being an occurrence. Their argument that it must have a determining factor rests on its character as a determination, even though this is conditional upon its coming into existence.”

The reply is:

This is correct. Yet it is open to two objections. The first is that its character as an occurrence points more clearly to an originator than its character as something determined points to a determining factor. For if someone were to say to them, “We do not concede that determination must have a determining factor,” their only answer would be weaker than their answer to someone who said, “We do not concede that whatever comes into existence must have an originator.”