in eternity past. Then, when He brought them into being, He remained as He had been before, so they came into being without anything new occurring at all.
Your position therefore committed you to holding that one of two possibilities can prevail without any determining factor, and that events can occur without a cause. It also committed you to denying the Maker His attributes—glorified is He—denying Him, and stripping Him of perfect power, since you denied Him the power to speak or act at all in eternity past.
You said:
‘His speech must have come into being after not having existed. Indeed, it must be created in something other than Him, rather than subsisting in His own being; or else He does not speak by His will and power.’
You also said:
‘He cannot bring anything into being unless His acting perpetually is impossible. Thus He can possess power and speech only on condition that He had not previously possessed power, acted, or spoken.’
You also said:
‘Events can exist only on condition that no newly occurring cause brings them about, and one of two possibilities can prevail over the other only on condition that there is no cause necessitating its prevalence.’
Thus, you made the coming into being of the world, and all of Allah’s acts and speech, conditional upon something whose very opposite is the actual condition. You altered rational propositions just as you distorted the divine Scriptures.
This emboldened the philosophers against you, and they went even further in distorting and perverting the divine Scriptures. Your most fundamental principle—upon which you based your affirmation of the Maker, His attributes, and His messengers, and on account of which you declared those who disputed with you to be unbelievers or misguided, whether they were among the people of the qiblah, followers of the early generations and the imams, or outside the people of the qiblah—became your assertion:
‘If each individual event has a beginning, it is impossible for their totality to have no beginning, because it is nothing other than its individual members.’