At other times, it cannot be described by that same word, but only by a plural form. The totality of black people is not described by the singular word aswad (black), nor as ghayr aswad (not black); rather, they are described as sūd (black, in the plural). Sūd is a plural form, so it means what we mean when we say: “Every Zanj is black.” When the predicate applied to the totality is not identical in wording to the predicate applied to its individual members, the case is analogous to the example of the Zanj. When the predicate is identical, however, the totality may or may not share the predicate of its individual members.

The former is illustrated when we say: “Everything that has come into being is created,” or “is contingent,” or: “Everything contingent depends upon something non-contingent.” This entails that the totality of things that have come into being is created and contingent, and that the totality of contingent things depends upon something non-contingent. This is because the predicate holds of the kind as such, and must therefore hold wherever that kind is instantiated. The kind is instantiated in the totality just as it is in each individual member.

The nature of anything that has come into being entails its being created and contingent, while the nature of anything contingent, if it exists, entails dependence upon something non-contingent. That nature necessarily belongs to the totality, and it is impossible for a nature to exist apart from what it necessarily entails. Thus, the totality of contingent things necessarily depends upon something other than itself, just as each individual member necessarily depends upon something other than itself. Likewise, the totality of created things necessarily has a beginning and is contingent, just as each individual member necessarily has a beginning and is contingent, in the same sense.

For some totalities, however, the term applies to their kind just as it applies to an individual member